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Did the market signal impending problems at Northern Rock? 
An analysis of four financial instruments. 
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Abstract  
The academic literature has regularly argued that market discipline can support 
regulatory authority discipline to monitor banking sector stability. This includes, 
amongst other things, using forward-looking market prices to identify those credit 
institutions that are most at risk of failure. The paper’s key aim is to analyse whether 
market investors signalled potential problems at Northern Rock in advance of the 
bank announcing that it had negotiated emergency lending facilities at the Bank of 
England in September 2007. A further aim of the paper is to examine the signalling 
qualities of four financial market instruments so as to explore both the relative and 
individual qualities of each. Therefore, the paper’s findings contribute to the market 
discipline literature on using market data to identify bank risk-taking and enhancing 
supervisory monitoring. In addition, the paper tests for evidence of an implicit “too-
big-to-fail” policy in UK banking. Our analysis suggests that private market 
participants did signal impending financial problems at Northern Rock in advance of 
the bank announcing that it had negotiated emergency lending facilities. These 
findings lend some empirical support to proposals for the supervisory authorities to 
use market information more extensively to improve the identification of troubled 
banks. 
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Introduction 
The academic literature has regularly argued that market discipline can support 
regulatory authority discipline to monitor banking sector stability [Evanoff and Wall, 
2001a; and Flannery, 1998]. This includes, amongst other things, using forward-
looking market prices to identify those credit institutions that are most at risk of 
failure. An extensive literature has empirically analysed the risk sensitivity of 
subordinated debt (SND) yields and equity prices [Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; 
Flannery, 1998; Flannery and Nikolova, 2003; and Sironi, 2003] and to a lesser 
degree the competing ability of different instruments to identify problem banks 
[Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes, 2006; and Evanoff and Wall, 2001b]. In addition, some 
banking supervisory authorities are showing an increasing interest in the use and 
quality of market signals on bank condition to support more traditional monitoring 
mechanisms [European Central Bank, 2004 and 2005; Schmidt, 2004; Persson and 
Blåvarg, 2003; and Birchler and Facchinetti, 2007]. 
 
On September 14th 2007 the UK bank, Northern Rock, announced that it had 
negotiated access to emergency lending facilities at the Bank of England. This news 
precipitated the first run on a UK bank for 130 years. The run only subsided when the 
government announced on the evening of September 17th 2007 that all deposits would 
be guaranteed. This unique event of near bank failure provides an opportunity to 
investigate the risk-signalling qualities of investors in a modern financial market 
context. The paper’s primary research aim is, therefore, to analyse whether market 
investors did signal potential problems at Northern Rock in advance of the bank 
announcing that it had negotiated emergency lending facilities. Financial innovation 
in the form of new market instruments, such as credit default swaps (CDS), and the 
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rapid rise, in the past fifteen years, in UK credit institution SND issuance, facilitates 
an analysis of multiple financial instruments in identifying impending bank failure. In 
so doing, the paper also aims to explore the relative and individual signalling qualities 
of a number of market instruments and, therefore, further the debate on using market 
data in banking supervision. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 is a literature review on the two key 
facets associated with this research paper. First, there is a review on the use of market 
information in bank regulation and supervision with a particular focus on the debate 
as to whether it could enhance market and regulatory authority discipline. This 
discussion is supported by an analysis of the recent report released by the UK’s 
Financial Services Authority into its own use of market information for supervisory 
purposes. Secondly, this section reviews the limited existing literature on the 
competing ability of different market instruments to identify problem banks. 
 
Section 2 summarises the key events that culminated in the run on Northern Rock. 
The analysis provides a context for the subsequent sections of the paper that examine 
whether the market was able to signal impending difficulties at Northern Rock. 
Section 3 introduces the paper’s research aims and questions and discusses the 
suitability of the Northern Rock case in examining the signalling qualities of market 
information. In addition, the contributions of this paper to the existing literature are 
emphasised. The section also explains the data and research methodologies utilised in 
the study.  
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Section 4 presents the results on the signalling qualities of different market investors 
to the impending problems at Northern Rock. These are examined on an instrument 
by instrument basis. Section 5 concludes on the signalling qualities of each of the 
financial instruments. In addition, the implications for the use of market signals in 
banking supervision and the market discipline debate, more generally, are discussed. 
 
Section 1: Supervisory use of market information 
Market discipline and market information 
The prices of financial instruments associated with credit institutions have two market 
discipline properties. First, they may increase an institution’s funding costs and 
therefore induce direct market discipline. Secondly, market prices may signal to the 
supervisory authorities and other interested parties bank-specific (micro-prudential) or 
systemic bank fragility (macro-prudential) concerns. This use of market data is termed 
indirect market discipline and shall form the focus of this paper. For example, it has 
been suggested that the secondary market prices of uninsured bank liabilities may 
provide information that the supervisory authorities can use in setting up early 
warning systems for bank examinations, pricing deposit insurance or setting capital 
requirements [Berger, 1991]. Supervisory authority interest in the use of market 
information as a market discipline mechanism is becoming increasingly evident. For 
instance, bank regulators and supervisors in the US -- affiliated with the Federal 
Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency – have collected and used market information 
“informally” for supervisory purposes since the end of the nineties. According to 
Schmidt (2004), about 80% of the official documents (for example, risk assessments, 
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supervisory plans and inspection reports) produced by these governmental and 
regulatory bodies contain explicit references to financial market information. The 
market indicators most often mentioned in supervisory reports are: debt ratings; stock 
prices; SND spreads; excepted default frequencies (EDFs) extracted from equity 
values; market capitalization; asset volatility; and analysts’ opinions [also see Furlong 
and Williams, 2006]. The various indicators, published regularly in specific 
documents called Monthly Market Data Reports, serve to identify general trends in 
the banking industry, to detect “outliers,” and to compare bank risk and performance 
across time and individual institutions. More recently, Sveriges Riksbank has begun to 
make more extensive use of market information to complement its conventional 
analysis of the soundness of the banking sector, which is mainly based on balance 
sheets and income statements. In its efforts to harness market monitoring, the 
Riksbank favours equity-based indicators, such as EDFs and Distance-to-Default 
(DD), because of the deeper liquidity in the stock market. The current use of market 
signals at the Riksbank is quite timid, but the experts in the Financial Stability 
Department anticipate promising developments in this direction in the near future 
[Persson and Blåvarg, 2003]. In the same vein, Birchler and Facchinetti (2007) 
discuss the suitability and pitfalls of market data for the assessment of banking and 
systemic risk from a Swiss perspective. Finally, the usefulness of market indicators 
for monitoring the banking system as a whole has been recognized by the European 
Central Bank (ECB) [European Central Bank, 2004; and 2005]. The ECB embraces a 
macro-prudential approach to financial stability and constructs aggregate measures of 
the DD that reflect the risk of the banking system as a whole. Although banking 
authorities in several countries are currently using market information to complement 
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traditional supervisory tools, they seem somewhat reluctant to trigger specified 
corrective actions based on signals sent by financial markets. 
 
The appeal of market-based information over accounting and supervisory information 
in the banking supervisory context is threefold. First, market data represents the 
aggregated opinions of a large number of market participants. Secondly, the data is 
forward-looking in contrast to the retrospective nature of accounting data. Finally, it 
has high frequency and is publicly available in a timely manner. On the other hand, 
market information may have qualities that are not consistent with supervisory 
authorities’ requirements and therefore provide misleading indirect disciplining 
signals. Market prices reflect the private costs of default to the investor and not social 
costs and so market participants may be willing to accept higher risk-taking than the 
supervisory authorities. For example, the academic literature argues that equity 
holders prefer more volatile assets and focus on the upside compared to the 
supervisory authorities, whereas debt holders, who do not benefit from the upside, 
have incentives that are more aligned with the supervisory authorities. As Gropp, 
Vesala and Vulpes (2006) indicate, the relative importance of this moral hazard 
problem becomes more pronounced the closer the bank reaches insolvency. 
Therefore, prices based on debt financial instruments could be more informative to 
the supervisory authorities than equity prices.1 Other requirements for appropriate 
market signals are a deep and liquid market to inform efficient market prices, and 
standardised securities so that there is comparability across different credit 
institutions. Finally, market prices may contain factors other than credit risk, such as 
taxes and liquidity risk, which can cloud “signal-to-noise” qualities. 
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A review of the empirical literature on market discipline and market signals highlights 
two generic types of study, each of which attempts to answer a specific research 
question:  
1. ‘Does market information accurately reflect contemporaneous information 
about a credit institution’s condition?’  
2. ‘Does the market incorporate this information in a timely manner so as to add 
information to supervisory assessments?’ And attached to this, ‘Can market 
participants predict individual bank or system-wide fragility?’ 
 
Concerning the first question, Hamalainen (2007) conducts an extensive literature 
review of the existing market discipline studies on whether market prices (equities 
and SND) reflect the risks inherent in a credit institution (the accuracy debate). 
Generally, the findings are that equity prices/returns and SND yield spreads do reflect 
banks’ risks as measured through balance-sheet or other market indicators [Flannery 
and Sorescu, 1996; Flannery and Nikolova, 2003; Sironi, 2003; and Hamalainen, 
Howcroft and Hall, 2007].  
 
The second question, one of timeliness, is more pertinent to this paper. DeYoung et al. 
(2001) and Berger and Davies (1998) observe that bank examinations do provide new 
information that market prices do not immediately reflect. However, Berger, Davies 
and Flannery (2000) conclude that supervisory assessments are generally less 
predictive of future changes in performance than equity or bond market indicators, 
except when these assessments derive from a recent on-site inspection. In addition, 
Cole and Gunther (1998) found that the persistence of private information in bank 
examination ratings is exhausted within six months. Looking specifically at the 
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predictive qualities of market instruments, Evanoff and Wall (2001b) find that SND 
spreads have some leading properties over capital adequacy measures in predicting 
bank condition. Jagtiani and Lemieux (2001) showed that, for their sample of five 
failed banks, spreads started rising as early as six quarters prior to failure. All-in-all, 
these findings concur with Flannery’s (1998) summary that: “market assessments 
have at least a plausible chance of providing timely, accurate information that 
supplements the supervisory agencies’ traditional ways of gathering and assessing 
bank quality.” 
 
A small literature has examined which market instruments may provide better 
predictive qualities of individual bank failure. As far as the authors are aware, only 
four studies exist. Three have compared the predictive qualities of SND yield spreads 
and equity-based market indicators, such as “distance to default”2 [Persson and 
Blåvarg, 2003; Krainer and Lopez, 2004; and Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes, 2006]. Two 
of the studies used a logit model methodology and one a descriptive approach. All of 
these studies appear to suggest that equity market indicators provide more value far 
from default, whereas yield spreads have a tendency to react close to default. The 
fourth study is by Swidler and Wilcox (2002). They compare Implied Volatilities 
(IVs) from exchange-traded options to share prices and sub-debt yield spreads for a 
small sample of US banks. Their findings suggest that there exist important co-
movements between the three market indicators. However, the IV estimates diverge at 
different times from the paths followed by stock prices and credit spreads. Evanoff 
and Wall (2001b) identify that, in establishing an early-warning system, the desire is 
to minimise the misclassification of problem banks as non-problem banks (type-I 
error). It is worth noting that small amounts of signal noise in SND yield-spreads may 
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produce high frequencies of misclassification errors, especially if the objective of the 
supervisory authority is to detect the most risky banks. Given that the supervisory 
mission is to identify a relatively few “bad” banks amongst a large sample of mostly 
“good” banks, the classification problem regulators might face in practice is highly 
relevant.3 Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2006) show that the different properties of bond 
and equity-based indicators help to reduce the risk of failing to discipline troubled 
institutions (type I errors). Equally, the findings of Swidler and Wilcox (2002) and the 
statistical analysis of the spread-risk relationship conducted by Bliss (2001) lend 
support to the idea of combining various risk indicators to improve the accuracy of 
bank distress forecasts. 
 
The FSA’s use of market information 
Following the Northern Rock crisis, the head of the FSA’s Senior Executive 
Management Committee commissioned its Internal Audit Division to review the 
FSA’s supervision of Northern Rock prior to the events of August 2007 when the 
credit crunch commenced. The Internal Audit Division’s report was published in 
April 2008 [FSA, 2008]. The report identifies key supervisory failings in the case of 
Northern Rock and weaknesses more generally in the supervision of a sample of other 
large credit institutions. The report provides recommendations for firms’ supervision 
in the future. One area that the report examines, and which is of particular interest in 
the context of this paper, is the use of market information by the supervisory 
authorities. This section of the paper reviews the report’s findings on the FSA’s use of 
market information in banking supervision and contextualises the findings in advance 
of presenting the research aims of this paper. 
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The Internal Audit Division’s report examined the Use of Intelligence by a sample of 
banking supervisory teams, one of which was the team responsible for Northern Rock. 
This covered both external and internal sources of information. The same section of 
the report also assesses the flow of this information between different parts of the 
FSA, which can, therefore, facilitate peer analysis by supervisory teams. The report 
found that “there were significant weaknesses in the effective flow of information 
between, and use of intelligence by, different parts of the FSA.” For example, at a 
number of hierarchical levels within the organisation (including individual 
supervisory team and sector team), the report concluded that: “none of the teams 
reviewed understood its role to include identifying outlier firms from peer analysis of 
business models.” The report clearly states the implications of this: “The resulting 
situation, where no team or individual within the FSA had the objective or resource to 
identify outlier firms based on financial analysis or any non-ARROW generated 
metric, meant there was a gap in the intelligence available to supervisors.” This is not 
to say that the teams did not receive any information that would enable them to 
conduct such analyses.4 The banking sector team and relevant individual supervisory 
teams did receive “simple analysis and collation of banks’ results and share price 
movements.” However, the report goes on to state that: “the work does not appear to 
have been well used by supervisors and appears to have been considered a low 
priority as the resource was reduced in February 2007.” Beyond simple share price 
movement analysis the only other external market data that appears to have been used 
were credit ratings and analysts’ reports. Again, in relation to this market data, the 
report identifies that: “there was confusion about responsibilities ... for obtaining and 
analysing external information” and that: “there was no clear mechanism for ensuring 
that a supervisor received all relevant credit ratings and analysts’ reports for their 
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firms.” Two of the desired outcomes from the Internal Audit Division’s examination 
of the Use of Intelligence were: “External analysis should be considered by 
supervisors in order to enhance their knowledge of the firms in relation to market 
sentiment”5; and, “Responsibility for conducting on-going peer/outlier analysis is 
clearly assigned”. Beyond the report’s own conclusion that market data provides 
considerable opportunities to enhance supervisory analysis, there is also the question 
as to whether the supervisory authorities should be widening their information scope 
to incorporate simple market data from other financial instruments, such as 
subordinated debt and credit default swaps and, where possible, performing more 
complicated analyses on existing data sources. This paper will provide some such 
analysis in the Northern Rock context and offer some suggestions for the supervisory 
use of market data. 
 
Section 2 - Northern Rock: The events leading up to the run 
on the bank’s deposits 
This section provides an analytical background to the events that culminated in the 
announcement on Friday September 14th 2007 that Northern Rock has been granted 
emergency funding facilities from the Bank of England. The analysis provides a 
context for the subsequent sections of the paper which examine whether the market 
was able to signal impending difficulties at Northern Rock. For reference purposes, 
appendix one tables the events both before and after September 14th in detail. This 
section utilises data from the London Stock Exchange Regulatory News Service and 
other financial media to identify key dates and access source material. 
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Northern Rock opened 2007 reporting record profitability in the last financial year 
[Northern Rock, 2007a]. The markets reacted to the news with the company’s share 
price rising 64p on the day to close at 1212p. This was 12p off the record high for the 
shares achieved only 3 weeks earlier. As a result of these record figures, the company 
increased its strategic target for return on equity to 20%-25% for 2007. The strong 
performance continued into 2007 with Northern Rock reporting a positive quarterly 
trading statement on 2nd April 2007. Northern Rock was on course for an 18% 
increase in full-year profits and this was driven by sustained lending growth and 
generally benign economic conditions. For example, net lending in the first quarter 
was up 34% on the same period last year. The Chief Executive reflected the positive 
position and outlook stating: “We have started 2007 strongly, with lending 
performance well ahead of the comparable period last year and a strong pipeline of 
business set to deliver asset growth in the top half of our strategic range” [Northern 
Rock, 2007b]. The bank’s trading statement had identified that due to an unexpected 
Bank Base Rate rise in January the resultant Base Rate-Libor gap remained noticeably 
higher than in 2006, but the bank did not believe that its profit growth forecast 
required adjustment.6 Figure 1 illustrates the growing divergence in the relationship 
between 3-month Sterling Libor and the Bank of England Base Rate since the 
beginning of 2006. Northern Rock’s reliance on securitisation to fund its rapid growth 
strategy, and how this contrasted with the other two mortgage banks’ strategies was 
not lost on the market. As Hughes (2007) states: “Northern Rock’s Adam Applegarth 
has embraced securitisation as a way of funding aggressive growth. Steve Crawshaw 
has dismantled Bradford & Bingley. ... Alliance & Leicester has proved a low-risk 
investment generating good returns. But Mr. Pym’s strategy could surely have been 
executed with greater drive. Alliance & Leicester has taken an overly cautious view of 
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the mortgage market, pulling back amid fears of a housing crash at a time when rivals 
have dashed headlong in pursuit of growth. This relative caution helps explain why 
Alliance & Leicester has not needed to go down the securitisation route pursued by 
Northern Rock. If you don’t grow, you don’t need more capital.” 
 
Insert figure 1 here 
 
The 27th June 2007 proved a turning point for Northern Rock’s growth. The bank 
issued a Pre-close period statement to the London Stock Exchange. This clearly stated 
that it expected full-year profits to fall short of analysts’ forecasts and was 
subsequently viewed by the market as a profits warning. The reasoning for the profit 
realignment is neatly encapsulated in the Pre-close statement: “Expectations for 
higher interest rates in the UK have risen further than anticipated at the time of 
Northern Rocks’ first quarter Trading Statement on 2nd April 2007. Given Northern 
Rock’s Libor-dominated funding platform, we have a structural mismatch between 
Libor and Bank Base Rates and because of changes in the forward interest rate curve. 
... In times of rising rates this dampens revenue growth with the opposite occurring as 
rates fall” [Northern Rock, 2007c]. The profits warning release on 27th June 2007 
appeared to act as the impetus for the market, more widely, to identify and report the 
weaknesses in Northern Rock’s business model. In particular, the bank’s significant 
reliance on wholesale funding to support its rapid growth and the mismatch between 
its funding source, based on Libor rates, and its revenue source, based on Bank of 
England Base Rates. These factors became the focus in subsequent reporting on 
Northern Rock’s performance [Croft and Tett, 2007; and Hill, 2007a]. An analyst 
quoted in Croft and Tett (2007) neatly encapsulates Northern Rock’s business model: 
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“Northern Rock is supposed to be a safe, conservative mortgage bank. If investors 
wanted to take a leveraged bet on interest rates they’d have gone elsewhere”. 
 
On 25th July 2007 Northern Rock released its Interim results for the six months to 30th 
June 2007 [Northern Rock, 2007d]. The Chief Executive reiterates that profits will be 
impacted by interest rate movements: “The outlook for the full year is being impacted 
by sharp increases in money market and swap rates seen in the first half. This has 
resulted in a negative impact on net interest income as mortgage pricing in the market 
generally has lagged behind increases in funding costs in the year to date.” Separately, 
the bank announces that: “The introduction of Basel II, which requires less capital to 
support new lending, also enables a review of the company’s dividend policy. The 
interim dividend therefore increases by 30.3% to 14.2p, payable on 26th October 
2007.”  
 
Investors’ concerns over Northern Rock intensify as a result of the US sub-prime 
turmoil coming to the fore in late July and early August 2007. Sharp falls in global 
stock markets and the seizure of credit markets led the US Federal Reserve and the 
ECB to pump unprecedented amounts of liquidity into the financial system from 9th 
August onwards. The sharp rise in Libor rates in early August (see figure 1) raised 
concerns that higher funding costs would squeeze Northern Rock’s margins and limit 
growth [Thal Larsen, 2007a] and force the bank to make a further profit warning 
[Hill, 2007b]. On top of this, the closure of credit markets prevented Northern Rock 
from distributing securitised assets and thus tapping its all-important wholesale 
funding sources [Thal Larsen, 2007b]. As one fund manager quoted in Thal Larsen 
(2007a) states: “If the asset-backed securities market is shut off, then the Northern 
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Rock business model is in serious doubt. It depends how long people hold this view”.7 
Concerns over both Northern Rock’s access to funding and at what cost continued in 
the market [Hume, 2007] until the Tripartite announcement on the morning of Friday 
14th September 2007 that the Bank of England is providing Northern Rock with 
access to emergency funding at a penal rate of interest. At the same time, Northern 
Rock issued a Stock Exchange statement and this emphasised the impact of the 
funding mismatch between Sterling Libor and Bank Base Rates on its future 
profitability [Northern Rock, 2007e]. The statement reads: “It has now become clear 
that the global credit and liquidity markets have not recovered in the early part of 
September, and that there continues to be a severe liquidity squeeze. In the UK, this is 
demonstrated by 3 Month Sterling Libor currently running at over 1% higher than 
Bank Base Rate. In these circumstances, Northern Rock has to take action to preserve 
liquidity and to maintain margins on its current loan book, while modifying its 
lending approach to avoid writing new business that is unprofitable in current 
conditions.” This news initiated a run on the bank’s deposits, which only subsided 
when HM Treasury announced on Monday 17th September 2007 an explicit full 
guarantee of Northern Rock’s existing deposits.  
 
Following the announcement on Friday 14th September, the Northern Rock franchise 
was in tatters. The bank swiftly amassed large borrowings with the Bank of England 
as retail and wholesale sources of funding withdrew from the bank [Northern Rock, 
2008] and the securitised markets remained closed. By the end of 2007, Northern 
Rock had borrowed £27 billion in emergency lending from the Bank of England to 
replace £28 billion in retail and wholesale funding that had deserted the bank. At the 
same time, three potential private bidders were interested in buying the bank. Given 
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the scale of Northern Rock’s borrowings with the central bank, the Government was 
deeply involved in the negotiations with the aim of securing the return of taxpayers’ 
money as swiftly as possible. Ultimately, on 17th February 2008 the Government 
decided that the best course of action was to temporarily nationalise Northern Rock. 
 
Section 3: Research aims and methodology 
Research aims and questions 
Given the preceding literature review on the potential supervisory benefits of using 
market information as a predictor of bank risk and the discussion on the use of market 
information by the FSA, the paper’s research aims and questions are: 
Aims 
• To examine whether market investors signalled potential problems at Northern 
Rock.  
• To examine the signalling qualities of different financial instruments. 
Questions 
• Did market investors signal increased risk at Northern Rock in advance of 
requiring emergency assistance from the Bank of England?  
• What can we learn from the Northern Rock experience concerning the use of 
market signals in banking supervision? 
 
A study of the Northern Rock context is particularly pertinent in addressing these 
questions and furthers the literature on market signalling in a number of ways. First, 
existing studies in this area have applied a proxy for bank failure (such as a 
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downgrade in the deposit-taking institution’s credit rating [Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes, 
2006] or downgrade in supervisory rating [Krainer and Lopez, 2004]). In contrast, 
Northern Rock represents a clear case of near individual bank failure. Secondly, 
existing studies have covered substantial sample time periods where there was more 
than one instance of “bank failure”. As a consequence, their analyses are partly 
clouded by the “failure” of a number of institutions in their sample. Thirdly, financial 
innovation in the form of new market instruments, such as CDSs, and the rapid rise in 
UK credit institution SND issuance in the past fifteen years [Hamalainen, Howcroft, 
and Hall, 2008], and consequential deepening of the market, provide an opportunity to 
explore and compare the market signalling qualities of a number of financial 
instruments in a modern financial market context. Existing studies have tended to 
focus on equities and SND, and in the case of SND usually used data from the early 
1990s when the debt markets (in particular in Europe) were substantially less 
developed. Fourthly, this paper introduces a further potential metric in signalling 
individual bank risk-taking through extracting implied idiosyncratic volatility from 
bank’s traded option contract prices. Finally, the single country study of this paper 
limits the wider relevance of the research findings and conclusions, but provides a 
cleaner analytical context in which to examine the research questions. For example, 
the study by Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2006) covers numerous European countries 
and as a result has to accommodate the influence of different government responses to 
bank fragility. The UK context of this research paper is particularly pertinent in this 
case, because there has been an implicit belief that UK banks, contrary to continental 
European ones, do not benefit from “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) type conjectural 
guarantees [Sironi, 2003].8 Last but not least, almost all papers in this area use data 
from “benign” or tranquil sample periods to discriminate between “bad” and “good” 
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banks. One of the main contributions of our paper is studying the informational 
content of bank security prices in a stressful macroeconomic environment that is 
likely to affect the financial conditions of the whole banking/financial system.  
 
Data and research methodology 
In answering the research questions, the paper analyses the market signals for 
Northern Rock compared to a set of eight peer UK banks.9 The selected banks, 
including Northern Rock, are the nine largest in the UK and represent over 80% of the 
UK banking system in asset terms. In addition, each of these banks has market trading 
in the alternative financial instruments under investigation. Therefore, the data 
comprises CDS spreads, SND spreads, implied volatilities from options prices and 
equity measures of bank risk (prices, trading volumes, returns and DD) for all of the 
sample banks from the beginning of 2006 or 2007 to the announcement of access to 
emergency liquidity facilities on Friday 14th September 2007. The CDS data is 
sourced from Credit Market Analysis, the options prices from Reuters and Datastream 
Thomson Financial and the equity and SND data from Datastream Thomson 
Financial. 
 
The most appropriate manner in which to answer the research question “Did market 
investors signal increased risk at Northern Rock in advance of requiring emergency 
assistance from the Bank of England?” is to apply a standard “early-warning” model 
to the data sets in the same vein as Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2006). However, the 
small sample of relevant UK banks prevents the application of such a methodology. 
Therefore, the research question is tackled in a graphical and descriptive statistical 
manner similar to Persson and Blåvarg (2003). Graphical representations of the 
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different market signals are presented to identify trends, with key market dates 
mapped onto the graphs to support the analysis. Wherever appropriate, different 
analytical techniques are applied to examine alternative market indicators. Adopting 
descriptive statistics prevents statistical significance testing of market instruments’ 
predictive capabilities. However, in light of the study’s unique context and the clear 
under-utilisation of market information by the FSA, the study still contributes to the 
two posited research questions. In addition to analysing the signalling qualities of a 
number of market instruments in advance of the announcement date, the paper also 
examines equity investor responses as a result of the announcement on September 14th 
2007. An event study methodology is applied and by creating control groups the test 
analyses equity holder perceptions of the TBTF policy.  
 
The study’s second research question is answered by analysing the paper’s empirical 
findings for each financial instrument for the first research question and comparing 
and contrasting the outcomes. 
 
Section 4: Empirical findings 
This section presents the findings of the research and is structured by market 
instrument type. The final part of the section brings together the key themes to 
compare the signalling qualities of each financial instrument and their potential 
application for supervisory authorities. 
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Equities 
Each of the banks in the study is listed in the FTSE100 and therefore has a liquid 
market for its equity liabilities. The existing literature presents a number of different 
equity indicators based on stock prices, trading volume, returns and option-pricing 
theory; all are examined in turn here. 
 
Equity prices 
The appeal of using equity prices as a signalling mechanism is that the data is readily 
available, although there is no unambiguous link between equity prices and default 
risk, because share price movements are also driven by other factors [Persson and 
Blåvarg, 2003]. In the Northern Rock context, however, their share price had been 
consistently falling since its record high in February 2007 and was identified in The 
House of Commons Treasury Committee (2008) report as one potential warning sign 
of impending problems. The deterioration in Northern Rock’s share price becomes 
truly apparent after the profit warning issued in late June 2007 and when their equity 
price data is compared with peer banks. Figure 2 presents the share price data for the 
three UK mortgage banks; the arrow indicates when Northern Rock issued a profits 
warning.  
 
Insert figure 2 here 
 
The deterioration in Northern Rock’s share price is all the more startling when UK 
banks’ share prices are rebased back to January 2006 (figures 3 and 4). Figure 4 
emphasises that Northern Rock was the best-performing UK bank share during 2006. 
Nevertheless, the graphs again suggest that the equity market became particularly 
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concerned with Northern Rock after the profit warning in June with accelerating 
deterioration in its share price. This may well be because the profit warning Stock 
Exchange Statement highlighted, for the first time, the fundamental shortcomings of 
Northern Rock’s business model to a wider audience. 
 
Insert figures 3 and 4 here 
 
Equity trading volumes 
Like share prices, equity trading volumes have no direct link with default risk. At 
best, analysis of trading volume data can simply indicate to the supervisory authorities 
that potential issues may have been identified by equity market participants that 
require further investigation. In the Northern Rock case, simple peer analysis with 
other mortgage banks illustrates consistently higher trading volumes in Northern Rock 
shares after the profits warning in June (see figure 5). The higher volumes may simply 
represent investors searching for potential value stocks, but the jump to average 
trading volumes above 10,000 does warrant further investigation. The high spike in 
trading in early August suggests that the market had by then understood the 
implications of the seizure in wholesale credit markets on Northern Rock’s business 
model. In a similar vein, the rise in Bradford & Bingley’s trading volumes from June 
2007 may have alerted the supervisory authorities to potential issues that again 
merited further investigation. Please note, the authors did not compare the trading 
volumes with the larger non-mortgage banks because their trading volumes are 
considerably higher. 
 
Insert figure 5 here 
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Equity returns 
A further approach is to analyse whether equity returns rather than price levels 
contain any signals about bank condition. For each mortgage bank we created a value-
weighted portfolio of all of the other eight banks. We computed weekly returns for the 
mortgage bank and each of their respective portfolios of banks and calculated the 
cumulative weekly return difference between January 2006 and 13th September 2007. 
Figure 6 presents the results. Like for the equity price signal graphs, it is only after the 
profit warning in June that Northern Rock’s equity returns become significant and 
thus signal a potential concern. 
 
Insert figure 6 here 
 
Distance to default 
A further approach in extracting information from equities is based on option-pricing 
theory, which treats the equity as a call option on the company. This enables 
investors’ implicit views of default risk to be determined in the form of the Distance-
to-Default (DD) measure. This measure calculates the number of standard deviations 
a banking firm is away from its default point (i.e. the asset value at which the firm 
will default or have zero market net worth). We derive our calculations of DD in a 
similar fashion to Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2006) and Persson and Blåvarg (2003). 
First, we estimate the asset value and asset volatility for each bank from the market 
value and volatility of equity and the book value of liabilities by solving numerically 
(using the Newton-Raphson method) a non-linear system of two equations: (1) the 
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value of equity modeled as a call on the bank assets using a standard options pricing 
based framework à la Merton (1974) and Black and Scholes (1973); and (2) the 
instantaneous relationship between assets and equity volatility derived from Ito’s 
lemma. Then, we compute DD using the KMV framework described in Crosbie and 
Bohn (2003). The final step in our derivation of a sophisticated equity-based indicator 
would be to convert the DD for each bank in our sample to a probability of default or 
a term structure of default probabilities. Moody’s KMV uses a rich database on 
historical defaults and bankruptcy rates to derive the empirical distribution mapping 
the DD to a corresponding expected default frequency for different time horizons. 
Alternatively, as we do not have access to a historical default database, we scaled the 
DD to a probability using Merton’s (1974) model. However, the results were 
deceptive, i.e. the default probabilities were largely undervalued, essentially zero for 
all banks, except Northern Rock after August 2007. This is because the empirical 
distribution of default rates exhibits wider tails than the normal distribution under the 
original Merton model. 
 
Our DD results are presented in figure 7. In line with our previous equity findings, 
equity investors’ perceptions of risk at Northern Rock deteriorated very rapidly after 
the profit warning in June compared to the sample banks. From then on, although all 
sample banks were reporting declining DD indicators (greater likelihood of default), 
Northern Rock was perceived as the most likely to default, as were the smaller 
mortgage banks. 
 
Insert figure 7 here 
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Summarising the equity analysis, investors were signalling potential concerns as early 
as February 2007 as Northern Rock’s share price was gradually falling from its 
historical highs in that month. However, it is only after the profit warning in June 
2007 that all of the equity market signals began to clearly indicate that investors had 
some concern with Northern Rock compared to peer banks. From then on, the share 
price, equity returns and likelihood of default were on a distinctly downward path 
compared to other mortgage and non-mortgage banks, and share trading volumes 
were significantly above the long run average. 
 
Time-varying estimates of Implied Idiosyncratic Volatilities from bank’s 
exchange-traded option contracts 
Among the various market-based indicators, the volatility of stock returns is a strong 
candidate to flag significant increases in the probability of a bank facing financial 
distress. Instead of using historical volatility (HV) measures of bank share prices as a 
basis for supervisory action, a better idea would be to focus on implied volatilities 
(IVs) from exchange-traded options to bank share prices. The appeal of considering 
implied rather than historical volatility estimates is threefold. First, in contrast to HV, 
which is by its very nature a back-ward looking measures of the bank’s equity risk, IV 
is inherently a forward-looking, market-based, forecast of the future volatility of the 
underlying asset. This important difference implies that IVs may contain reliable 
information about stress events not captured in time series of past returns. Second, 
recent findings from the option literature indicate that IV levels contain virtually all 
relevant information about future realized volatility [see Mayhew, 1995; Christensen 
and Prabhala, 1998; Mayhew and Stivers, 2003; and Diavatopoulos, Doran and 
Peterson, 2008]. In addition, according to Dennis, Mayhew and Stivers (2006), the 
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daily changes in IV contain useful incremental information about future return 
volatility, beyond the previous IV level.10 In the banking context, Swidler and Wilcox 
(2002) show that IV estimates have lower error forecasts of future volatility than HVs 
do and significantly improve forecasts based only on HVs. Third, at least for the 
largest banking organizations, the market for option contracts on bank equity is active, 
deep, and sufficiently liquid to provide reliable signals to supervisors. Among the UK 
listed banks, all banks included in our stock market sample (except Bradford & 
Bingley) have option contracts that are traded on London International Financial 
Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE). 
 
For the purpose of our analysis, we extracted detailed information on bank equity 
options contracts (option type, lot size, market price,11 volume of trading, strike price, 
exercise price, expiry date, trading cycle etc.) from Reuters and Datastream Thomson 
Financial. Table 1 summarizes basic descriptive statistics on key variables 
characterizing the option contracts on UK listed banks’ stocks traded on LIFFE in 
2007 and highlights that the option market is deeper and more liquid for the largest 
UK banks. However, the option contracts on the two mortgage lenders’ equity were 
also actively traded during the analyzed period and option open interest is reasonably 
high. This is quite important as IV estimates tend to be noisy for thinly traded option 
contracts [Mayhew and Stivers, 2003; and Dennis, Mayhew and Stivers, 2006]. Not 
surprisingly, the highest Put/Call open interest ratios are observed for Northern Rock 
(7.28:1 on average), indicating that investors were starting to conjecture that the stock 
market will go down and selecting financial instruments that gain value when prices 
decline rather than when they rise. 
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Insert Table 1 about here 
 
As each bank in our sample has a whole specter of traded options with different strike 
prices and maturities, we construct a “standardized” measure of IV using a 
methodology that is similar to Mayhew (1995) and Swidler and Wilcox (2002). Our 
IV estimates are based on the nearest two “at-the-money” options (i.e. the most liquid 
series) - one above and one below the underlying price - using values from the nearest 
expiry month options. Since strike prices are set at standard intervals for each class, 
options are rarely at the money. Consequently, we interpolate between the two IVs to 
calculate an estimate of the IV for a hypothetically “at-the-money” Call/Put option. 
We next average the IVs of the two (Call and Put) option contracts to obtain the IV 
for options with the strike price nearest to the underlying bank stock price. The last 
stage includes an interpolation of maturities in order to obtain IV estimates for a 
hypothetical at-the-money option having a 30 day constant maturity.12 As all option 
contracts on UK listed banks’ stocks traded on LIFFE are American-type options, the 
IVs are computed using the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein binomial tree model to take into 
account dividends and the possibility of early exercise [Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein, 
1979]. 
 
From a bank supervisor’s perspective, it is useful to distinguish between fluctuations 
in IV time-varying estimates due to changes in bank risk profile and fluctuations 
induced by the changes in the volatility of the market. To decompose the total implied 
volatility into systematic and idiosyncratic components, we first need to construct a 
barometer of market volatility. The equity volatility index for the UK was computed 
in the same manner as individual banks’ IVs, i.e. by taking implied volatilities from 
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Calls and Puts traded on the FTSE100 index that are near the money. Following 
previous studies on implied volatility dynamics [Dennis, Mayhew and Stivers, 2006; 
and Diavatopoulos, Doran and Peterson, 2008], we use two methods to estimate the 
individual bank stock’s implied idiosyncratic volatility (IIV).13 The first method is 
based on the variance decomposition implied by the market model, while the second 
method uses a decomposition of the total implied variance based on the discrete-time 
version of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck stochastic process (see Appendix 2 for technical 
details). In our subsequent analysis, we favor the second method for two distinct 
reasons: (i) it takes into account the mean-reversion behavior of market IV, which is 
an essential time series property of implied volatility indices; (ii) it generates a 
smaller number of bank-days where the IIV estimate is negative.14 As a result, we 
only report IIVs using the second method. 
 
Table 2 describes the statistical distribution of our two measures of volatility implied 
by the market prices of the options contracts on UK listed banks’ stocks (IV and IIV) 
after release of the profit warning by Northern Rock and before the BoE decided to 
grant financial support on September 14th. Not surprisingly, the highest values for 
both measures of IV are observed for the two mortgage lenders, Alliance & Leicester 
and Northern Rock. By contrast, HSBC and Lloyds, two large international banks, 
have the lowest risk profile according to our IV metrics. It is worth noting that the 
implied idiosyncratic variance represents a substantial portion (almost 70%, on 
average) of the total implied variance. This is an important result because, from a 
micro-prudential perspective, bank supervisors should be more concerned about 
changes in bank specific risks rather than changes in volatility of the whole market. 
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Insert Table 2 about here 
 
To visualize the way in which the option market reacted to the deterioration of bank 
financial conditions prior to the Northern Rock crisis, we plot in Figure 8 the time 
evolution of our IIV indicator for our sample of banks between January 1st and 
December 31st, 2007. As is the case with the equity indicators described in the 
previous section, the two mortgage lenders included in our option sample were 
perceived as more risky compared to the larger UK banks. Equally, the option market 
flagged bank-specific signs of vulnerability only after Northern Rock issued its profits 
warning in June 2007. Despite the financial support granted by the Bank of England 
on September 14th, concerns about Northern Rock’s insolvency persisted in the option 
market after that date. 
 
Insert figure 8 here 
Subordinated debt 
The most commonly used measure of risk where bond markets are concerned is bond 
spread; that is the excess yield on a bank’s bond over and above the yield on a 
government bond of the same maturity. The market discipline literature has frequently 
espoused the potential benefits to the regulatory authorities of SND. In contrast to 
other debt holders (Certificates of Deposit and senior debt holders) the incentive of 
subordinated debt-holders to monitor and limit bank risk-taking is more aligned with 
the supervisory authorities (and hence taxpayers). This implies that they would exert a 
greater restraint on bank management and, as such, is a suitable instrument of market 
discipline [Hamalainen, Hall and Howcroft, 2003]. These benefits have led to 
proponents of SND suggesting that large deposit-taking institutions frequently issue 
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sizeable amounts of subordinated debt; in other words, a mandatory subordinated debt 
policy [US Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, 2000]. Therefore, it is most 
appropriate, in line with other studies, that subordinated debt spreads are analysed.  
 
UK banks have been issuing SND in record levels since 1999 and, in value terms, are 
the second largest issuers of publicly-issued debt after the US [Hamalainen, Howcroft 
and Hall, 2008]. Subsequently the market has become extremely liquid and therefore 
offers risk-signalling potential. In this study, we focus on sterling-issued SND only 
because this is the currency in which mortgage banks primarily issue and because 
existing market discipline studies have shown that currency of denomination does 
influence SND spreads [Hamalainen, Howcroft and Hall, 2007]. In addition, we only 
select SND that indicates regular trading activity and which are neither perpetual in 
maturity nor callable. 
 
Figures 9 and 10 present the findings for the mortgage banks. The data has been split 
based on the number of years remaining to maturity. Figure 9 presents those bonds 
with ten years and less to maturity and clearly shows that Northern Rock spreads had 
been declining until the profit warning in June. Subsequently, the spreads begin to 
rise, but it is only with the start of the credit crisis in early August that Northern 
Rock’s spreads widen significantly to potentially signal any concerns (see ellipsoid). 
By then the regulatory authorities were well aware of the potential funding difficulties 
that Northern Rock may experience and they were in regular contact with Northern 
Rock. Figure 10 presents longer maturity SND and emphasises that it is only with the 
onset of the credit crisis that Northern Rock SND spreads may have begun to signal 
divergences from fellow mortgage banks, although Bradford & Bingley’s spreads 
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were also widening at this time (see ellipsoid). Prior to that, all longer dated mortgage 
bank SND were tracking a very similar path. 
 
Insert figures 9 and 10 here 
 
For comparative purposes, figures 11 and 12 report the SND spreads for a selection of 
larger UK banks with less than 10 years to maturity and greater than 10 years to 
maturity respectively. In both maturity groups, prior to the turbulence in credit 
markets the spreads were generally lower than those of the equivalent maturity 
mortgage banks. However, the onset of the credit crisis, in general, brought mortgage 
banks and non-mortgage banks SND spreads closer together. Therefore, it is difficult 
to deduce any bank-specific risk signals. Noticeably, however, throughout the sample 
period the larger banks’ spreads track a very similar path with no discernable bank-
specific shifts away from peer banks. This is in contrast to those witnessed in the 
Northern Rock case. 
 
Insert figures 11 and 12 here 
 
Summarising the SND spread data trends, investors were recognising increased risk in 
all banks from July 2007 onwards, suggesting market-wide, rather than bank-specific 
influences. Extracting reliable signals that there was impending bank failure at 
Northern Rock was not possible. In fact, in the early part of 2007 shorter-dated 
Northern Rock spreads were tightening. There were discernable rises in Northern 
Rock spreads following the seizure of credit markets in early August and further 
marked rises in spreads in early September. However, Bradford & Bingley were also 
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reporting widening spreads at this time and that was partially clouding any mortgage 
bank specific risk signals. In addition, figures 11 and 12 illustrate that larger bank 
SND spreads were also widening thus creating further noise; although, in contrast to 
Northern Rock no larger bank saw its spreads shift significantly away from peer 
banks. 
 
Credit Default Swaps 
Credit default swap growth in the past ten years provides an opportunity to explore 
the risk signalling qualities of this financial instrument. The characteristics of this 
credit derivative are such that it should provide a clear measure of default risk in the 
underlying company’s debt, the spread reflecting the measure of default risk. CDS 
prices are available for Senior and SND debt, however, in this study, the authors have 
used senior debt spreads only. This is far from ideal, but one of Northern Rock’s peer 
mortgage banks, Bradford & Bingley, does not have tradable credit default swaps 
based on SND. The SND analysis above showed that Bradford & Bingley’s SND 
spreads widened in late August and, therefore, for comparative purposes the authors 
felt that it is important to include this peer bank. 
 
Figure 13 presents the results for mortgage banks on one-year maturity CDS 
contracts. On an absolute basis, both Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley are 
viewed as more risky than Alliance & Leicester. This is all the more apparent in 
figure 14, which includes all of the non-mortgage banks as well. Then only Standard 
Chartered has spreads that are comparable with Northern Rock and Bradford & 
Bingley. In the summer of 2007 the market for mortgage bank CDSs dries up, until in 
mid-August when Northern Rock registers significant widening spreads. This is 
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undoubtedly reflecting the funding fears in the wholesale markets at the time. 
Notably, the same concerns are not applied to Bradford & Bingley and Alliance & 
Leicester. This in turn suggests that investors were specifically becoming concerned 
with Northern Rock’s creditworthiness. Analysing the same data on a relative basis, 
however, clouds the picture. All of the non-mortgage banks’ spreads were widening 
significantly in late July, albeit from very small bases, and, therefore, the considerable 
relative rise in Northern Rock’s spreads in August was being matched by equally 
spectacular relative rises in the larger UK banks. In this case it would be hard to argue 
that bank-specific risk factors are being signalled by the CDS market. In addition, the 
spectacular rises in HSBC and Royal Bank of Scotland’s one-year risk protection 
cloud the signals somewhat further. 
 
Insert figures 13 and 14 here 
 
Figures 15 and 16 present the findings for senior tier, five-year maturity CDS 
contracts since January 2007. This confirms the points made in the one-year CDS 
discussion above, except that, in absolute terms, Standard Chartered is now viewed by 
the market as containing more default risk than Northern Rock and Bradford & 
Bingley. 
 
Insert figures 15 and 16 here 
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Comparative signalling analysis of the three financial instruments and 
their application by the supervisory authorities 
Of the four financial instruments analysed in this study, equities appear to present the 
earliest and clearest signs of potential concerns with Northern Rock prior to the 
announcement in September 2007. There were bank-specific falls in prices and 
returns, trading volume registered a markedly upward shift, and the DD indicator 
rapidly deteriorated (a sign of increased bank default risk). However, the bank-
specific signs only became apparent after Northern Rock issued a profit warning in 
late June. It is at this stage that the bank explained how funding mismatches would 
prevent analysts’ profit forecasts from being met. This disclosure appears to have 
highlighted to the market the weakness in Northern Rock’s business model and, 
therefore, subsequent divergence in the Libor-Bank Base Rate relationship cemented 
further falls in Northern Rock’s share price.  
 
The second metric of bank financial distress analyzed in the present study is the 
idiosyncratic component of IV from bank’s exchange-traded option contracts. This 
forward-looking market indicator has been neglected so far in the market discipline 
literature (a notable exception is however Swidler and Wilcox, 2002). As is the case 
with equity indicators, the mortgage lenders appear to be more risky compared to the 
other UK banks a couple of months before the Bank of England decided to take 
action, i.e. only after Northern Rock released its profit warning. 
 
SND spreads and CDS spreads were considerably slower in indicating concerns with 
Northern Rock. With hindsight, both instruments reported significant jumps in 
Northern Rock’s spreads following the shut down in wholesale credit markets. In that 
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way these markets did react prior to the bank requesting funding assistance from the 
Bank of England. However, these signals were extremely late and also very difficult 
to decipher for bank-specific risk elements.  
 
In the case of SND spreads, it was difficult to extract clean bank-specific signals from 
the general market trend for rising bond spreads at the time. For example, finding 
bonds of comparable maturity issued by more than one mortgage bank was not 
possible and so term structure components were also reflected in spread comparisons. 
Therefore, although the UK bank-issued SND market has become considerably larger 
and more liquid in the past ten years, finding comparable SND instruments is difficult 
for risk signalling purposes. This is why proponents of SND market discipline 
propose mandatory subordinated debt policies that contain standardised debt 
structures.  
 
In the case of CDS spreads, the findings illustrate that the CDS market is still not 
sufficiently deep to extract clean signals. There was no trading in mortgage banks’ 
CDS for some time during the summer, despite volatility in the credit markets. 
Therefore, liquidity risk is currently an issue for CDS spread signals. In addition, it is 
difficult to decipher bank-specific risk signalling depending on whether one examines 
absolute spread levels or relative spreads. In absolute terms, Northern Rock was 
consistently perceived by the CDS market as one of the riskier UK banks. Therefore, 
the market did identify Northern Rock’s risk characteristics. However, Bradford & 
Bingley and Standard Chartered Bank were also exhibiting comparably high absolute 
spreads. The onset of the liquidity crunch in August led the larger UK banks’ CDS 
spreads to rise dramatically and therefore their relative spreads rose considerably 
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compared to Northern Rock. In that context, does Northern Rock, or the larger banks, 
merit attention from the supervisory authorities? A further difficulty in identifying 
bank-specific risk in CDS spreads is the number of different maturities available and 
potentially conflicting information. For example, one-year maturity CDS spreads for 
Alliance & Leicester were predominantly below those of Northern Rock and Bradford 
& Bingley during 2007 (see figure 13). However, for five-year maturity CDS spreads 
this was not the case (see figure 15).  
 
Apart from comparing the signalling quality of the three financial instruments, the 
study’s findings contribute to the academic debate on the timeliness of market 
information compared to supervisory authority actions. The House of Commons 
Treasury Committee (2008) reports that the supervisory authorities became concerned 
with Northern Rock when the wholesale credit markets seized up on 9th August 2007. 
This prompted the regulatory authorities to initiate regular communication with 
Northern Rock and begin considering a number of solutions, including selling the 
bank to a larger UK credit institution. Mapping this information onto the market 
signalling results illustrates that the equity market did provide some evidence of 
investor concern in advance of the regulatory authorities contacting Northern Rock. In 
contrast, the SND and CDS markets did not. Both of these markets appear to have 
structural limitations which hamper their signalling capabilities. Therefore, this paper 
suggests that the regulatory authorities could make more use of market information to 
enhance their monitoring of bank risk, but at this time efforts should be concentrated 
on equity market signals. Furthermore, the results indicate that the FSA could adopt 
far more rigorous and sophisticated equity analysis than is currently prepared in order 
to monitor market sentiment. There were a number of relatively straightforward 
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equity indicators that should have alerted the supervisory authorities to, at least, 
undertake further investigation into Northern Rock’s increasingly negative market 
perception. This is not to suggest that earlier intervention by the supervisory 
authorities could have prevented Northern Rock from experiencing what was a rapid 
deterioration in liquidity. The profit warning (which prompted the first clean market 
signs of concern) was not released until late in June 2007 and the unprecedented 
collapse in wholesale credit markets started in early August 2007. Within a month, 
Northern Rock was approaching the Bank of England for emergency funds. 
 
Spillover effects and “Too-big-to-fail” 
The generally higher SND and CDS spreads for the three mortgage banks suggests 
that the market views the UK banking system as consisting of two tiers: the six 
multinational banks and the three UK-focused mortgage banks. This distinction is also 
suggested by the smaller equity trading volumes for the mortgage banks, compared to 
the multinational banks, and by the fact that the three mortgage banks are the smallest 
three, measured by assets. As a result, the authors decided to test whether equity 
investors perceived the announcement that Northern Rock had access to emergency 
liquidity facilities as a sign that problems would spill over to the larger UK banks or 
alternatively that Northern Rock and / or the other mortgage and non-mortgage banks 
may be perceived by investors as TBTF.  
 
This hypothesis was tested using a standard event study methodology and we tested 
both the abnormal equity returns and abnormal volume of trading for a five-day 
period surrounding the day (t=0; 14th September2007) when Northern Rock 
approached the Bank of England and obtained emergency financial support. The 
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abnormal equity returns are derived from the one-factor market model estimated over 
the period [–260; –11] using the FTSE All-Share benchmark index. The abnormal 
volume of trading metric is defined as the difference between the observed turnover 
ratio and the median turnover ratio through the estimation window.15 To analyse 
whether investors perceived the announcement differently depending on the type of 
bank, the sample of nine UK banks was partitioned into two sub-samples; the three 
mortgage banks and the larger “other banks.” 
 
The results are presented in table 3. Panel A reports the abnormal equity returns for 
each of the three mortgage banks, the whole sample of nine banks (“All Listed 
Banks”) and then the two sub-samples of banks over each of the five event days. To 
understand the findings, it is first appropriate to explain the regulatory authority 
announcements on each of the event days. As previously explained, t=0 is the day that 
it was announced that Northern Rock had been granted access to emergency lending 
facilities. Following the announcement, there was a run on the bank for four days (two 
days being over the weekend) and including t=+1, namely Monday 17th September. 
After the close of trading on Monday 17th, and in an attempt to stop the bank run, the 
government announced an explicit guarantee of all Northern Rock’s deposits, which 
all market commentators also read as an implicit guarantee of all UK bank deposits. 
Therefore, t=+2 reflects the belief that all UK bank deposits were now fully supported 
by a government guarantee. 
 
Insert table 3 here 
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The event study results clearly suggest that the announcement that Northern Rock had 
access to emergency lending facilities resulted in statistically significant negative 
returns for each of the three mortgage banks. This only subsided on day t=+2, once 
the government guarantee had been announced. On that day, the three mortgage 
banks’ shares also reported statistically significant abnormal gains, confirming that 
investors perceived an implicit guarantee on all banks. Column 6 of Panel A reports 
the cumulative effect for the three mortgage banks and confirms the preceding equity 
returns discussion. Column 7 reports the abnormal equity returns for the portfolio of 
six larger banks. In contrast to the portfolio of mortgage banks, there was no 
statistically significant abnormal movement in returns on days t=0 and t=+1. This 
suggests that investors either perceived the larger banks as unlikely to be affected by 
spillover effects from the Northern Rock crisis or that they are TBTF and so the 
government will implicitly guarantee them. There was a statistically significant 
positive movement in abnormal returns on day t=+2 once the government guarantee 
had been announced. Column 8 compares the abnormal returns in the two sub-
samples and reports the t-statistics for the difference in average abnormal returns 
between the two sub-samples. This clearly illustrates that investors perceived the 
larger banks as unlikely to be affected by the Northern Rock crisis. Whether this is 
because they are perceived as TBTF is difficult to establish; however, the statistically 
significant movements in the other mortgage banks does suggest that equity investors 
were differentiating between mortgage banks and the larger multinational banks and 
they did not consider the mortgage banks as being TBTF. 
 
Panel B reports abnormal volumes of trading during the event period. The results 
confirm that investors were differentiating between the two types of bank. Mortgage 
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banks witnessed statistically significant abnormal volumes of trading throughout the 
event period [0; +2] whereas the larger “other banks” did not. Again, comparing the 
difference in average abnormal volume of trading between the two sub-samples 
confirms that investors were less concerned that the larger banks would be affected by 
spillover effects from the Northern Rock announcement.  
 
Section 5: Conclusions 
The existing literature on the predictive qualities of market information has found that 
equity market indicators provide more value far from default, whereas SND yield 
spreads have a tendency to react close to default. In the Northern Rock context, our 
results, despite being unable to conduct a logit methodology, suggest similar findings. 
Equity indicators illustrated a clear negative reaction for Northern Rock compared to 
peer banks following the profit warning in late June 2007. In contrast, SND spreads 
and CDS spreads began to indicate clear concerns, if at all, only once the credit crisis 
had begun, which was only a month before Northern Rock required liquidity 
assistance. The time-varying estimates of IIVs extracted from option prices clearly 
deserve further attention in the future because the informational content of this 
forward-looking indicator appear to be useful to bank supervisors. From a micro-
prudential perspective, the most encouraging result is that the idiosyncratic 
component represents a substantial portion (more than 70%) of total IV for a banking 
firm. 
 
The paper’s findings also support the existing market discipline literature in that it can 
prove difficult to extract clean risk signals from SND spreads and, thus, careful 
judgement must be exercised when interpreting them [Hancock and Kwast, 2001]. 
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This is in part because spreads reflect many dimensions of risk, such that it may be 
difficult to disentangle the credit risk from other factors. For example, the spread can 
contain compensation for the different taxation treatment of government and 
corporate bonds; a liquidity risk component can differ between bonds due to the size 
of the issue as well as whether it is a recent issue; and finally, yields will reflect not 
only expected default risk, but also the loss given default. In the case of CDS spreads, 
the paper has shown that the market is not sufficiently deep in small bank CDS to be 
able to currently rely on these market signals. Equally, the paper has suggested that 
there can be conflicting signals between absolute and relative CDS spreads.  
 
From a supervisory perspective, the paper has shown that equity market information 
may have provided the FSA with some predictive signals of impending default at 
Northern Rock, whilst SND and CDS spreads only possibly signalled concerns once 
the FSA was already communicating with the bank. Furthermore, the paper has shown 
that the supervisory authorities may want to consider equity market analyses that 
extend beyond their simple share price movements. Equally, the paper highlights the 
potential benefits to the regulatory authorities in observing a number of early warning 
metrics concurrently. In so doing, the paper introduces a further metric, implied 
idiosyncratic volatility and in the Northern Rock case, this metric signalled potential 
concerns at the same time as the equity market.  
 
The paper also analysed the equity market reactions to the announcement that 
Northern Rock has access to emergency liquidity facilities. The findings suggest that 
there were no spillover effects to the larger multinational banks, whereas the smaller 
mortgage banks did not appear to be perceived as “Too-big-to-fail”. 
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Appendix 1: Northern Rock - pre-crisis and post crisis 
timeline 
24 January 2007 Northern Rock releases preliminary results for the year ended 31 December 
2006. They report record gross and net lending as well as record profitability. 
The strategic target for return on equity is increased to 20%-25%. The 
Northern Rock share price rose 64p on the news to close at 1212p. 
9 February 2007 Northern Rock shares close at a record 1251p. 
31 March 2007 Northern Rock reports a regulatory capital position of 9.74%. This is in 
breach of the regulatory capital requirement imposed by the FSA by £85.5m 
or 0.2%. The breach is reported to the FSA in the bank’s quarterly capital 
filing on 19 April 2007. 
The breach is not public knowledge until Northern Rock issues its 2007 
Annual Report and Accounts on 31 March 2008. The FSAs Internal Audit 
Division report into the FSAs supervision of Northern Rock released on 28 
April 2008 also reports the banks breach of capital requirements in March 
2007 [FSA, 2008]. The report states: “The breach was rectified by the 
disposal of £833 million of secured commercial loans to Lehmans, which was 
completed on 22 June 2007, and by the issue of £328 million of subordinated 
debt on 25 June 2007.” 
2 April 2007 Northern Rock issues a quarterly trading statement indicating that it is on 
course for an 18% increase in full-year profit, due to sustained lending growth 
and generally benign economic conditions.  
The statement also indicates that the bank is continuing moves towards 
calculating regulatory capital requirements using the Basel II methodology. 
The bank expects to be a major beneficiary of implementing Basel II and it 
remains their preference to repatriate initial future and excess capital from 
this exercise through increasing dividends 
26 April 2007 The Bank of England issues its latest Financial Stability Report. One of its 
discussion points are banks increasing reliance on wholesale funding through 
securitisations and how it exposes banks to liquidity-related risks if that 
funding was to cease. The report cites the February 2007 experience in the 
US sub-prime indices market. 
22 June 2007 Northern Rock completes the sale of £838 million of its commercial secured 
loans to Lehman Brothers and conditionally agrees to sell up to a further £732 
million of such loans in the second half of 2007. This is publicly announced 
in the Stock Exchange Statement released on 27 June 2007. 
25 June 2007 Northern Rock issues $650m (£328m equivalent) of Upper Tier 2 
subordinated debt. This is publicly announced in the Interim Results for the 
six months ending 30th June 2007 that is released to the Stock Exchange on 
25th July 2007. 
27 June 2007 Northern Rock issues a Stock Exchange Statement titled, Pre-close period 
statement and Basel II strategic update. This is in effect a warning that its 
full-year profit is set to fall short of analysts’ forecasts. The statement 
highlights the banks’ funding mismatch: “Expectations for higher interest 
rates in the UK have risen further than anticipated at the time of Northern 
Rocks’ Q1 Trading Statement on 2 April 2007. Given Northern Rock’s Libor-
dominated funding platform, we have a structural mismatch between Libor 
and Bank Base Rates and because of changes in the forward interest rate 
curve....In times of rising rates this dampens revenue growth with the 
opposite occurring as rates fall.” 
Northern Rock’s share price falls almost 10%. 
29 June 2007 Northern Rock is granted a Basel II Internal Ratings Based (IRB) waiver 
from the FSA. This enables the bank to calculate regulatory capital 
requirements from now on using the Basel II methodology. 
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25 July 2007 Northern Rock releases its Interim results for the six months to 30 June 2007. 
The Chief Executive reiterates that profits will be impacted by interest rate 
movements: “The outlook for the full year is being impacted by sharp 
increases in money market and swap rates seen in the first half. This has 
resulted in a negative impact on net interest income as mortgage pricing in the 
market generally has lagged behind increases in funding costs in the year to 
date.” 
The bank reports its interim regulatory capital position under the newly 
granted Basel II methodology. The bank states: “The implementation of Basel 
II results in our ... risk-weighted assets at 30 June 2007 falling from around 
£33.9 billion under Basel I to £18.9 billion under Basel II”. Furthermore, the 
bank reiterates its intention to release surplus capital: “The introduction of 
Basel II, together with the planned disposal of capital inefficient assets and 
continued capital management...results in an anticipated regulatory capital 
surplus over the next 3 to 4 years. This surplus will enable the reduction of 
previously planned subordinated debt issues and permit capital repatriation of 
up to £300 to £400 million over this period”. The bank also states: “The 
introduction of Basel II, which requires less capital to support new lending, 
also enables a review of the company’s dividend policy. The interim dividend 
therefore increases by 30.3% to 14.2p payable on 26 October 2007.” 
Nevertheless, five days before the half-year end period Northern Rock issues 
£328 million of Upper Tier 2 subordinated debt. Although analysts do not 
know what the FSAs individual capital requirement is for each bank, an astute 
analysis of the interim statement would have shown that without the issuance 
of the Upper Tier 2 capital, the sale of commercial secured loans to Lehman 
Brothers and the Basel II waiver (all of which happened in the final week of 
June) Northern Rock’s regulatory capital position using the existing Basel I 
methodology may well have been below 10%; a potentially worrying sign. 
26 July 2007 The FTSE 100 drops 3.14% as concerns over the US sub-prime crisis 
intensify. 
9 August 2007 The European Central Bank, the US Federal Reserve and Bank of Japan 
pump unprecedented amounts of liquidity into the financial system to allay 
fears about a credit crunch. This represents the start of numerous actions by 
central banks into the money markets to shore up confidence in the financial 
system. 
10 August 2007 The FTSE 100 suffers its worst one-day fall (3.7%) for more than four years.  
Northern Rock shares fall 9.6%, down almost 40% this year and 
consolidating its position as the worst performing blue-chip stock of the year. 
16 August 2007 The FTSE 100 drops a further 4.1% 
20 August 2007 Northern Rock completes the disposal of £465 million of commercial secured 
loans to Lehman Brothers. 
14 September 2007 The Tripartite Authorities announce that the Bank of England is providing 
Lender of Last Resort emergency funding facilities to Northern Rock to allow 
it to continue operating. Under the open-ended facility, the bank is charged a 
penal rate and can use mortgages and mortgage-backed securities as 
collateral. 
17 September 2007 HM Treasury announce a full guarantee of Northern Rock’s existing deposits 
in an attempt to stem the deposit run on the bank and restore financial 
confidence. 
21 September 2007 Confirmed that Northern Rock had borrowed around £3 billion from the Bank 
of England under the emergency funding facility. 
24 September 2007 Northern Roc bows to political pressure and cancels its proposed £59 million 
dividend payout. 
27 September 2007 Announced that Northern Rock’s debt to the Bank of England is now £8 
billion. 
4 October 2007 Announced that Northern Rock’s indebtedness to the Bank of England now 
stands at around £11 billion. 
9 October 2007 HM Treasury extends the full deposit guarantee to new depositors of 
Northern Rock. 
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11 October 2007 Revealed that Northern Rock’s indebtedness to the Bank of England now 
stands at around £13 billion. The emergency facility conditions are relaxed 
allowing Northern Rock to use any collateral to access the Bank of England’s 
lifeline. 
18 October 2007 Revealed that Northern Rock’s indebtedness to the Bank of England has risen 
to £16 billion. 
19 October 2007 The chairman of Northern Rock resigns. 
16 November 2007 The Chief Executive of Northern Rock announces that he will resign in 
January 2008, once the bank has completed the second phase of its strategic 
review. 
13 December 2007 The Chief Executive of Northern Rock resigns. 
31 March 2008 The Annual Reports and Accounts state that Northern Rock’s indebtedness to 
the Bank of England was £27 billion at 31 December 2007. 
11 January 2008 Northern Rock agrees to sell 2% of its mortgage assets to JP Morgan. The 
funds are used to repay some of the emergency loan provided by the Bank of 
England. 
17 February 2008 The Chancellor of the Exchequer announces that neither of the two remaining 
private sector bids for Northern Rock offer enough value to the taxpayer, and 
therefore the bank will be temporarily nationalised. 
18 February 2008 Northern Rock shares are suspended on the London Stock Exchange. 
 
Sources: Authors and Hall (2007)
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Appendix 2: The Implied Idiosyncratic Volatility (IIV) metric 
 This appendix briefly describes the technical details behind the procedure used 
to compute the Implied Idiosyncratic Volatility (IIV) metric discussed in the paper. 
Following the previous literature on implied volatility dynamics, we use two methods 
to estimate the individual bank stock’s IIV: the first one is based on the variance 
decomposition implied by the market model, while the second method uses a 
decomposition of the implied market variance based on the discrete-time version of 
the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck stochastic process. 
 
A2.1 IIV estimates based on the market model decomposition of total variance 
 The procedure consists in estimating the market model parameters for each bank 
by regressing the daily (log-differenced) stock return for the relevant bank security, 
, upon the corresponding broad market return (FTSE100), : 
 
 The market model parameters,  and , are estimated over 250-day “rolling” 
windows before each day from January 1st through December 31st, 2007. We retain 
the time-varying beta coefficient estimates and compute the IIV measures for each 
bank i, each day t, using the variance decomposition implied by the market model: 
 
where  is bank i’s implied idiosyncratic volatility on day t,  is bank i’s total 
implied variance,  is bank i’s time-varying beta coefficient estimate, and  is 
the standardized implied variance of FTSE100, i.e. the equity volatility index for the 
UK. For some days, the quantity inside the square root computed in this manner takes 
negative values; in these exceptional cases, we derive the IIV measure by 
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interpolating between the previous day’s estimate and the subsequent day’s value of 
IIV, which are both positive. 
 
A2.2 IIVs derived from the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck representation of market volatility 
 To extract the idiosyncratic component of IV using the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck 
representation of market volatility, we start by expressing the standardized implied 
variance of the UK index FTSE100 as an arithmetic mean reverting process: 
 
where  is the long-run equilibrium level (i.e. the long-run mean which the volatility 
series tends to revert),  is the constant speed of reversion,  is the instantaneous 
volatility parameter, and  denotes the increment of the Gauss-Wiener process, 
, with . 
 The equation describing the continuous-time dynamics of implied variance 
presented above can easily be rewritten, in its discrete time version, as follows: 
 
where  and . Within the particular context of 
our application, we run the following regression, which is the well-known first-order 
autoregressive process AR(1), to estimate the parameters of the mean-reversion 
process: 
 
 It is straightforward to show that , , and 
, where  is the standard deviation of the 
residual error term and  is the instantaneous volatility parameter of the mean-
reversion process. 
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 Finally, using the estimated mean-reversion parameters and the same variance 
decomposition implied by the market model, we compute the IIV measures for each 
bank i, each day t as follows: 
 
where  is bank i’s time-varying beta coefficient estimate using a 250-day rolling 
window ending on day  and , i.e. the change 
in implied variance of the UK index FTSE100 predicted by the discrete-time form of 
the mean-reversion process. 
 As in the previous case, the quantity inside the square root computed in this 
manner may exceptionally take negative values. If it is the case, we derive the IIV 
measure by interpolating between the previous day’s estimate and the subsequent 
day’s value of IIV, which are both positive. 
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1
 However, the debate between equity and SND signals is still very much open because: (1) extracting 
relevant information from credit spreads may be a difficult task (liquidity premia are often excessively 
volatile and other technical factors besides default risk may influence credit spreads); (2) (sub-)debt 
markets are less liquid, active and deep than equity markets; and (3) debtholders’ incentives to monitor 
may be affected by the perception of TBTF-type guarantees or other (governmental) guarantees  
2
 The distance to default combines stock price information with stock volatility and leverage, and 
measures the number of standard deviations away from default, where default is defined as the point at 
which assets are just equal to liabilities. This property makes the distance to default a useful indicator 
from a supervisory perspective. 
3
 See the discussion in Bliss (2001, pp. 33-36). This intuition can be illustrated using relatively simple 
numerical simulations. We should like to thank Robert Bliss for explaining to us in great detail how to 
conduct the numerical simulations. 
4
 The report does identify a further and related weakness, staff expertise: “partly because of turnover, 
the FSA is short of expertise in some fundamental areas, notably prudential banking expertise and 
financial data analysis.” 
5
 The weaknesses in supervisory teams obtaining and analysing data do not appear to have been 
restricted to external sources of information. The report also lists as a desired outcome: “Regulatory 
returns for a firm and its peers should be easily accessible to supervisors and should be used to input to 
the on-going assessment of the firms.” 
6
 Notably, Northern Rock’s 2006 Annual Reports and Accounts reported that interest margins were 
down on 2005 due to a widening gap between 3 Month Libor and the Bank Base Rate, especially in the 
second half of 2006. 
7
 Subsequently, the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee’s investigation into the Northern 
Rock crisis has shown that the seizure in funding markets on 9th August 2007 prompted the Financial 
Services Authority to contact Northern Rock, because it perceived the bank to be at risk from the 
freezing of financial markets. Thereafter the Financial Services Authority and Northern Rock were in 
daily telephone contact. Soon afterwards all parties in the Tripartite Committee were in constant 
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contact with Northern Rock to devise a strategy to extricate Northern Rock from its difficulties. [HM 
Treasury Committee, 2008] 
8
 The UK government’s “rescue” of Northern Rock depositors on 17th September 2007 does suggest a 
possible policy shift, but the government’s guarantee arrangements explicitly state that subordinated 
debt instruments are excluded. 
9
 The eight banks comprise of: HSBC; Barclays; RBS; HBOS; Lloyds; Standard Chartered; Bradford & 
Bingley; and Alliance & Leicester. The last two banks, along with Northern Rock, are informally 
distinguished from the other six through the term “mortgage banks” because they were originally 
mutual building societies and most of their business still revolves around housing loans. These three 
banks are also the smallest ones in the sample. 
10
 However, the view that IV measures clearly dominate volatility estimates based on historical return 
data has not reached consensus in the literature. For instance, Canina and Figlewsky (1993) found that 
the S&P index IV contains little information regarding future volatility and, hence, has almost no 
predictive power in forecasting future volatility. So, they conclude that IV is an inefficient and biased 
forecast of future volatility. This atypical empirical result may be attributed to data limitations and 
sampling procedures (for further discussion, see Christensen and Prabhala, 1998). 
11
 This is the official settled price issued by the exchange at closing of the day session. If the official 
settlement price is not reported by the exchange on a particular day, then the closing price will be 
stored as exchange definition. In this exceptional case, the close may be derived from last trade, last 
mid bid/ask price, last lowest ask or highest bid price. 
12
 The methodology used in the present study mirrors the volatility indices methodology used in the 
market place. Many volatility indices (e.g. VIX, the implied volatility on the S&P 500 index option, or 
the VDAX index disseminated by Deutsche Börse) take into account a number of eight options, 
including a Call and a Put at the two strike prices closest to the money and the nearest two expirations. 
Hence, our IV measure is slightly lower because the methodology we used is based on the “at the 
money” implied volatility interpolated between only two options (one strike above and one bellow the 
underlying price). 
13
 To our knowledge, this is the first paper that proposes the use of idiosyncratic implied volatilities as 
a bank risk metric for supervisory purposes. Swidler and Wilcox (2006) also advocate for the use of 
IVs to improve the regulatory oversight of banks, but they do not break down total IV in order to 
extract the idiosyncratic component. 
14
 Across our sample, we observed only 12 occurrences where the estimated implied idiosyncratic 
variance has negative values. In these exceptional cases, we replace the negative value by the 
interpolated value between the previous day’s estimate and the subsequent day’s value of IIV, which 
are both positive. 
15
 The turnover ratio is calculated as the daily volume of trading expressed as the logarithm of the 
percentage of the number of outstanding shares that is traded on a given day. 
 Table 1. Option Contracts on UK Listed Banks’ Stocks traded on LIFFE: Descriptive Statistics 
  Option ticker Option series Open interest Trading volume 
Bank symbol live in Sept. 2007 26/06-14/09 26/06-14/09 
    (CALL/PUT) (CALL/PUT) (CALL/PUT) 
Alliance & Leicester LEI 15/15 2660.2/3442.2 75.5/81.0 
Barclays BBL 77/77 102009.8/114050.7 604.4/1158.2 
HBOS HAX 57/57 7207.5/15208.8 183.5/410.5 
HSBC HSB 89/89 129309.3/203796.0 499.0/1144.4 
Lloyds TSB 73/73 39581.1/53864.4 370.1/410.8 
Northern Rock NKR 30/30 3217.5/23418.3 70.5/133.0 
Royal Bank of Scotland RBS 152/152 21074.5/50568.8 293.9/589.2 
Standard Chartered SCB 21/21 5558.8/4565.4 53.4/97.5 
This table provides descriptive statistics on key variables characterizing the option contracts on UK listed 
banks’ stocks traded on LIFFE in 2007: (i) option ticker symbol; (ii) number of different option series 
(Call/Put, option type, expiry dates, strike prices…) “live” in September 2007, i.e. issued at least 22 trading 
days before September 14
th
 and expiring after September 21
st
, the date after which expiring option classes 
stop trading (all options included in our sample belong to the March/MJSD cycle); (iii) total number of 
option contracts (Call/Put) that were “opened” on average after release of the profit warning on June 26
th
 
and before September 14
th
, i.e. contracts that were traded but not yet liquidated (total “open interest” of 
all Put or Call options for the day for all expiry months); (iv) daily volume of traded contracts or “market 
breadth” between June 26
th
 and September 14
th
, i.e. the total turnover of all Puts or Calls for the day for all 
expiry months 
Source: authors’ computations based on data provided by Reuters/Thomson Financial 
 
 Table 2. Implied Volatility (IV) & Implied Idiosyncratic Volatility (IIV) Estimates 
  Implied Volatility (IV) Implied Idiosyncratic Volatility (IIV) 
Bank 26/06-14/09 26/06-14/09 
  Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max 
Alliance & Leicester 34.47% 34.57% 3.58% 23.07% 41.77% 27.02% 26.67% 2.84% 16.51% 34.86% 
Barclays 32.71% 32.43% 5.09% 24.28% 42.79% 19.80% 20.53% 3.85% 12.19% 28.09% 
HBOS 30.12% 27.39% 8.25% 21.74% 47.45% 21.19% 16.77% 7.85% 10.11% 39.47% 
HSBC 19.93% 20.36% 3.54% 13.98% 29.30% 14.72% 14.43% 2.78% 9.08% 22.55% 
Lloyds 25.86% 25.31% 2.57% 20.74% 32.46% 18.89% 19.07% 2.86% 10.93% 23.84% 
Northern Rock 39.33% 37.49% 11.80% 26.69% 70.77% 28.09% 25.06% 10.41% 8.79% 63.64% 
Royal Bank of Scotland 29.77% 29.86% 5.04% 22.14% 38.60% 21.47% 20.62% 2.65% 16.99% 29.54% 
Standard Chartered 28.96% 29.12% 3.40% 24.93% 36.95% 13.72% 15.06% 4.30% 4.00% 19.48% 
This table describes the statistical distribution (mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum over the period June 26
th
 – September 14
th
) of our two 
measures of volatility implied by the market prices of the options contracts on UK listed banks’ stocks: Total Implied Volatility (IV) and Implied Idiosyncratic Volatility 
(IIV). We infer a “standardized” measure of IV based on the nearest two “at-the-money” options series -- one above and one below the underlying price -- using 
values from the nearest expiry month options (the options series switches to the next available month on the first day of the expiry month). We next interpolate 
between the two IVs to calculate an estimate of the IV for a hypothetically “at-the-money” Call/Put option. Finally, we average the IVs of the two (Call and Put) 
option contracts to obtain the IV for options with the strike price nearest to the underlying bank stock price. As all option contracts on UK listed banks’ stocks traded 
on LIFFE are American-type options, the IVs are computed using the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein binomial tree model to take into account the possibility of early exercise.  
To compute the idiosyncratic component of implied volatility (IIV), we use a decomposition of the total implied variance based on the discrete time version of the 
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck stochastic process, which takes into account the mean-reversion behavior of IV (see Appendix 2). As a benchmark for the option market 
volatility and sentiment, we use the implied volatility on the FTSE 100 index options, calculated in the same manner as the individual bank’s IVs, from both Calls and 
Puts that are near the money. 
Source: authors’ computations based on data extracted from Reuters 3000 Xtra and Datastream Thomson Financial 
Table 3. Stock Market Reaction to the Decision Made by the Bank of England to grant emergency 
liquidity facilities to Northern Rock on September 14
th
, 2007 
Day / 
Window 
Northern 
Rock 
Alliance & 
Leicester 
Bradford 
& Bingley 
All Listed 
Banks 
Mortgage 
Banks 
Other 
Banks 
Mortgage vs. 
Other 
Panel A: Abnormal equity returns 
–2 –0.31% –0.92% 1.39% –0.22% 0.05% –0.36% 
0.16 
 (–0.22) (–0.84) (1.27) (–0.41) (0.06) (–0.70) 
–1 –5.87% –3.47% –0.68% –1.51% –3.34% –0.59% 
–1.08 
 (–4.13)
***
 (–3.16)
***
 (–0.62) (–2.83)
***
 (–3.70)
***
 (–1.16) 
0 –35.63% –5.68% –6.28% –5.60% –15.86% –0.47% 
–6.07
***
 
 (–25.02)
***
 (–5.15)
***
 (–5.70)
***
 (–10.46)
***
 (–17.52)
***
 (–0.91) 
+1 –40.95% –35.56% –14.42% –10.64% –30.31% –0.80% 
–11.63
***
 
 (–28.67)
***
 (–32.10)
***
 (–13.06)
***
 (–19.80)
***
 (–33.37)
***
 (–1.55) 
+2 5.98% 26.35% 4.17% 5.03% 12.16% 1.47% 
4.21
***
 
  (4.19)
***
 (23.85)
***
 (3.79)
***
 (9.40)
***
 (13.43)
***
 (2.86)
***
 
[–2;–1] –6.17% –4.40% 0.71% –1.73% –3.29% –0.95%  
 (–3.08)
***
 (–2.83)
***
 (0.46) (–2.29)
***
 (–2.58)
***
 (–1.32)  
[0;+1] –76.58% –41.25% –20.70% –16.24% –46.17% –1.27%  
 (–38.28)
***
 (–26.59)
***
 (–13.38)
***
 (–21.41)
***
 (–36.00)
***
 (–1.74)  
[0;+2] –70.60% –14.90% –16.53% –11.20% –34.01% 0.20%  
  (–28.81)
***
 (–7.84)
***
 (–8.72)
***
 (–12.07)
***
 (–21.66)
***
 (0.23)   
Panel B: Abnormal volume of trading 
–2 0.92 –0.30 0.70 –0.01 0.44 –0.23 
1.56 
 (1.23) (–0.45) (1.22) (–0.02) (0.83) (–0.64) 
–1 1.77 1.00 1.31 0.44 1.36 –0.02 
3.23
***
 
 (2.37)
***
 (1.50) (2.29)
***
 (1.18) (2.56)
***
 (–0.06) 
0 3.98 1.75 2.41 1.31 2.71 0.61 
4.92
***
 
 (5.34)
***
 (2.63)
***
 (4.21)
***
 (3.54)
***
 (5.11)
***
 (1.72) 
+1 4.12 2.57 2.04 1.22 2.91 0.38 
5.93
***
 
 (5.53)
***
 (3.87)
***
 (3.56)
***
 (3.29)
***
 (5.48)
***
 (1.06) 
+2 3.36 2.91 2.21 1.28 2.82 0.51 
5.42
***
 
  (4.50)
***
 (4.38)
***
 (3.86)
***
 (3.46)
***
 (5.33)
***
 (1.44) 
[–2;–1] 2.68 –0.19 1.91 0.43 1.80 –0.25  
 (2.54)
***
 (–0.20) (2.36)
***
 (0.82) (2.39)
***
 (–0.50)  
[0;+1] 8.10 4.14 6.49 2.53 5.62 0.99  
 (7.68)
***
 (4.41)
***
 (8.02)
***
 (4.83)
***
 (7.49)
***
 (1.96)
***
  
[0;+2] 11.46 8.01 10.06 3.81 8.45 1.50  
  (8.87)
***
 (6.97)
***
 (10.14)
***
 (5.94)
***
 (9.19)
***
 (2.43)
***
   
This table presents the abnormal equity returns (Panel A) and volume of trading (Panel B) for a five-day 
period surrounding the day t = 0 (September 14th, 2007). The abnormal returns are derived from the one-
factor market model estimated over the period [–260; –11] using FTSE All-Share benchmark index. As the 
abnormal returns are in fact prediction errors, the standard deviation estimator used in the definition of the 
test statistic was adjusted in order not to overstate the significance levels (the correction factor is defined in 
Mikkelson and Partch (1988, p. 122, corrected formula 3). Also, the statistical tests were adjusted to avoid 
the misspecification problems due to extreme clustering and cross-correlation of security returns in the 
event period (see Brown and Warner, 1985, pp. 7-8). The abnormal volume of trading metric is defined as 
the difference between the observed turnover ratio and the median turnover ratio through the estimation 
window. The sample of UK listed banks was partitioned into two sub-samples: “Mortgage banks” (viz. 
Alliance & Leicester, Bradford & Bingley, and Northern Rock) and “Other banks” (Barclays, HBOS, HSBC, 
Lloyds, Royal Bank of Scotland, and Standard Chartered). We also report the mean cumulative abnormal 
returns (Panel A) and trading volume (Panel B) computed over various event windows: [–2; –1], [0; +1], and 
[0; +2]. The last column reports the t-statistics for the difference in average abnormal returns (Panel A) and 
trading volume (Panel B) between the two sub-samples of banks. 
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level  
Figure 1. Excess of 3-mth £ Libor over UK base rates 
 
 
 
Figure 2. UK mortgage banks' equity prices, rebased value (% of 01/01/07 value) 
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Figure 3. UK mortgage banks' equity prices, rebased value (% of 01/06 value) 
 
 
 
Figure 4. All UK banks' equity prices, rebased value (% price in 01/06) 
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Figure 5. UK mortgage banks' equity trading volume (10 day MA) 
 
 
 
Figure 6. UK mortgage banks' cumulative weekly return difference (%) with portfolio of other UK 
banks 
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Figure 7. Time evolution of the Distance-to-Default (DD) indicator for the nine UK listed banks 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Time evolution of Implied Idiosyncratic Volatilities (IIV) of UK listed banks’ stocks 
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Figure 9. UK mortgage banks' SND spreads (bps), 10y and less 
 
 
 
Figure 10. UK mortgage banks' SND spreads (bps), 10y and more 
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Figure 11. Selected large UK banks' SND spreads (bps), 10y and less 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Selected large UK banks' SND spreads (bps), 10y and more 
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Figure 13. UK mortgage banks' CDS spreads (bps), 1y Senior 
 
 
 
Figure 14. UK banks' CDS spreads (bps), 1y Senior 
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Figure 15. UK mortgage banks' CDS spreads (bps), 5y Senior 
 
 
 
Figure 16. UK banks' CDS spreads (bps), 5y Senior 
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